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WESLEY A. STURGES
William 0. Douglast
WHEN I first met Wesley A. Sturges he was beginning to construct his
book Commercial Arbitrations and Awards which was published in 1930. In-
deed our first real visit was in the stacks of the Law Library in Hendrie Hall
about midnight when he was putting the finishing touches on one chapter.
Prior to then, I had been elected to the Yale Law faculty. This night in the
Law Library and later in an all-night cafe over a cup of coffee, we fashioned
the first bonds of friendship.
Wes Sturges, a Vermonter, had some of the qualities of granite. His friend-
ship was durable; his convictions were not easily eroded. Mft. Mansfield in
Vermont, viewed from a distance, shows a profile of a prostrate man-Fore-
head, Nose, Lips, Chin, and Adam's Apple. The Chin is the highest point,
which leads Vermonters to say, "Thank God Vermont carries its Chin higher
than its Nose." Wes Sturges held his chin high-proudly individualistic and
courageous.
He was one of the best law teachers of this century-provocative, teasing,
argumentative, challenging. He forced students to reach far horizons. He made
fun by indirection of the conventional, he defied conformist doctrine, he de-
manded improvement of the status quo. Those who are the best teachers usual-
ly are not prolific scholars. Wes Sturges combined both talents. Yet he tired
of each; and some of his happiest years, I think, were in administration. Yale
Law School has had many outstanding Deans. Yet I believe that he was in a
way the Deans' Dean during his two terms from 1945 to 1954. He was champion
of the younger man and the off-beat, nonconformist who was bringing new light
to the law. He fought the entrenchment of mediocrity and fought it so strenu-
ously that he in time tired of being Dean at Yale.
Yet at Miami he returned to the task; and in the last talk I had with him
(in the Spring of 1962) he fairly bubbled with excitement over the large de-
sign of what he thought would in time be America's finest law school.
His interests were so diverse he never became pedantic. A few times when
he left the law he did so out of a feeling of challenge. He always returned to
find life's fulfillment in the discipline which has made his memory bright in
the lives of hundreds of lawyers and judges. His standards were exacting ones.
Rules and principles of law were honored but only if they served the social
purpose that promoted the good life. He was more interested in what a rule
did to people, what its impact was on the living, than what was its origin in
antiquity. Some called his jurisprudence "sociological" and they often used
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the word derisively. Yet he knew that the law was not carved in stone by gods
but shaped by judges who were human. He knew that their predilections and
their particular values often fashioned the law. Wes Sturges also knew that
the judge who shouted the loudest that he was deciding cases by the law, not
by his personal values, was like the lady who protested too much. He had no
respect for them. He knew that law and justice were handmaidens even in the
workings of federalism. He had until his last day only disrespect for those who
pretended that the spectacles men wore had nothing to do with what they de-
cided, either on or off the bench.
WESLEY A. STURGES
Thurman W. Arnold
Ix order to appraise the permanent value of Wesley Sturges' contribu-
tion to the law it is necessary to describe the intellectual conflict out of which
it arose. For more than a quarter of a century Harvard had been the pre-
eminent American law school. It had sent its missionaries to the faculties of
most of the law schools in the United States. Dominant in their thinking was
the idea that the only important part of the law was what they called sub-
stantive law. Legal procedure was a mere trade school subject, unworthy of the
attention of profound and thoughtful scholars. And this substantive law was
divided and classified into fields: Contracts, Agency, Torts, Conflicts, and
so on. These fields had been discovered and logically divided by the great legal
scholars of the past. They were linked together at the top by a mysterious in-
trospective science called Jurisprudence. It was recognized, even by conserva-
tives, that slavish adherence to precedent, exemplified in the old maxim that
hard cases make bad law, was inhibiting the growth of the law to meet modern
conditions. Pound had written his essays on sociological jurisprudence-the
law did not have to impose cruel judgments on litigants for the sake of con-
sistency with some established formula. The American Bar had organized the
American Law Institute for the purpose of restating an orderly set of legal
principles out of the growing mass of conflicting decisions. But that did not
mean restating the law in terms of the actual subjects in controversy. Instead,
it was devoted to the reconciliation of abstract principles which governed the
various fields of the law. These fields owed their origin to the common law
writs. They had been developed into a logical system by the Harvard curricu-
lum.
Opposing this philosophy were a group of intellectual rebels called "realists."
These men had discovered the psychological fact that thinking is a form of
behavior-a shocking idea for those times. They proceeded to demonstrate that
the so-called principles of law did not have the relationship to the actual con-
troversies before the courts which the traditional jurisprudence said they had.
But when the realists had proved their case to, their students, which was not
difficult after the first shock wore off, they had no place to go.
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When I came to Yale in 1930 this controversy between the realists and the
logicians of the law was going on with a great atmosphere of excitement and
heat. But this conflict was not an examination of what was happening in our
courts; it was rather a search for the core truth as to what Law-with a
capital L-really consisted of. In such a philosophical battle the practical science
of procedure, which is the source and root of Law, was found unworthy of
attention.
Wesley Sturges was never caught in this sterile philosophical debate. I have
no doubt he agreed with the philosophical realists, but he never became
obsessed with teaching their negative position. Instead, he went to the heart of
the problem, which was a reclassification of judicial decisions that would con-
form to the kind of controversy before the courts instead of fitting them into
the nineteenth century categories.
I probably saw more of him than anyone else on the faculty. He was work-
ing on a course called Credit Transactions. The focus of that course and of
his casebook was not Bills and Notes, Agency, or any of the conventional
fields of the law. It was rather an examination of how courts treated the
phenomenon of the extension of credit in a society where credit had become far
more important as a means of distributing goods than it ever had been before.
Wesley had learned from Dean Clark, as I did, that the center and growth
of the law depended upon legal procedure. Dean Clark had begun that long
and successful struggle which led to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and its subsequent adoption in most states. It was a revolutionary idea,
though it seems commonplace today. Wes Sturges was engaged in the
same kind of enterprise in his own field. He was an indefatigable worker. He
looked at cases with new insight, his eye always fixed on what the courts did.
He had no conventional guide-line. Adopting Dean Clark's procedural ap-
proach, he broke down old categories and created new ones. He was never
bemused with abstractions.
This is not the time or the place to review his work in detail, or his gradual
rise from a dissenting voice in legal education to an acknowledged leader.
It is sufficient to say that in my view he revolutionized the conventional law
curriculum.
The most interesting and exciting years of my life were the eight years
which I spent as a professor of law at Yale. I remember so well when Wesley
Sturges, after working half the night, would come into my office in the morn-
ing with a new discovery in the field of Credit Transactions or Arbitration.
Wes Sturges had broken loose from the conventional classifications of the
Law. The discoveries were new and exciting. I remember the long talks on the
new kind of curriculum that Bill Douglas, Walton Hamilton, and Wesley
Sturges were trying to establish at Yale under the sympathetic leadership of
Dean Clark. These men, though working in different fields, were united in one
common idea. That was that the center of the law, and the source of its
growth, was the understanding of legal procedures.
As Dean of the Law School, Wesley Sturges carried on in the same tradition
as Dean Clark. By the time he resigned the Yale Law School had become the pre-
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eminent representative of a modem and original approach to the study of the
Law.
I close with a word about Wesley Sturges as a personality. I have known
few men with such complete integrity and independence of thought. He ac-
cepted no theory or idea merely because all sound and respectable people
were endorsing it. His sense of humor was so keen that he would laugh at
himself as well as others. It redeemed him from all trace of vanity. His in-
tegrity was beyond that of an ordinary lawyer. When, during the depression,
he left law teaching, it was to assume the post of adviser to a trade association
at what seemed to his colleagues a fantastic salary; he resigned from the as-
sociation without giving any consideration to financial loss when its members
would not follow the advice he gave them. The freedom of expression, the
opportunity to follow his own ideas, rather than defending those of his clients,
which he found in the teaching of law, were worth more to him than financial
reward.
The values for which the Yale Law School stands today, which I believe
are unique values, not to be found to any comparable extent in any other
school, are personified in the life and work of Wesley Sturges.
It is a sad day when we have to bid him Good-bye.
WESLEY A. STURGES
Fleming James, Jr.t
WHEN I came to the Yale Law School as a student in 1926, Wesley
Sturges was already one of the outstanding teachers among a group of great
teachers, including seniors like Arthur Corbin and W. W. Cook, and juniors,
as they then were, like Charles Clark, Edwin Borchard, and Robert Hutchins.
This was an exciting era. Hohfeld was still a fresh memory and his analy-
tical method had stirred up one of those7 academic controversies so dear to the
student's heart. But in this renascence of the Yale Law School there was also
another movement under way which I think had deeper significance and more
lasting influence than Hohfeldian analysis. This was legal realism, which was
by no means confined to Yale, but was a fairly new thing in American legal
scholarship and found warm hospitality at the school, particularly among the
younger members of the faculty.
The brand of legal realism most familiar to Yale Law students of the nine-
teen-twenties was known as the Functional Approach. The essence of this was
an insistence on viewing legal rules and concepts in the light of their social
utility and function-evaluating them in their relationship to the rest of life,
so to speak, rather than as parts of a self-contained and more or less self-sufficient
conceptual system.
This, of course, is a basically simple and now thoroughly familiar idea that
permeates much of legal scholarship and teaching. That was not true in the
nineteen-twenties. Then the Functional Approach was a fighting faith that en-
[Vol. 72:639
WESLEY A. STURGES: IN MEMORIAM
listed some of the ablest and most forward looking men of the time. Well in the
vanguard of these men was Wesley Sturges. Indeed, as I look back, I think
that to the students of that day in the Yale Law School Wesley symbolized the
Functional Approach.
Not only was he in the forefront of a movement that had a profound effect-
I think for the better-on legal thinking, but his personal qualities as a teacher
made him one of the great law teachers of his generation. He had a way about
him, tinged by an older New England, that was homely and dry and a little
sardonic, but made warm and appealing by an underlying kindliness and a
genuine affection for his students. I remember his starting out more than one
class by saying: "Good morning, Mr. Chancellor, I am a Surety, favorite of
Equity, and I wonder what you can do for me this morning in the following
situation." Then he would go on to probe and question, sometimes the devil's
advocate, seldom stating or explaining. At times he would ride a student pretty
hard, but I have never known one to resent it, for there was never any malice.
The upshot of it was that we came to the understanding and the insight by
ourselves; this I think is the best kind of pedagogy.
Wesley was not only an influential thinker and great teacher; he was also
a very attractive person and a warm human being whom we looked on vith
pride and affection. He was always neat and carefully dressed and there was
something debonair about his manner that made him cut a dashing figure in
our eyes. Five years after I graduated I came back on the faculty to teach. I
remember asking George Dession-my closest friend on the faculty then-
about my new colleagues. The one thing that stands out in my mind from that
conversation is one of the things he said about Wesley. "You can trust him,"
he said, "Wesley is completely honest."
This was a productive period for Wesley. It was about this time that the
casebooks were published for his tvo great courses, Credit Transactions and
Debtors' Estates-we had used mimeographed materials in my student days.
Also the text book on Arbitration appeared, which marked him as an out-
standing leader in this field. There were also original and leading articles deal-
ing with wage earner credit administration. These, of course, were along one
of his main lines of interest. But there was another article in the field of
procedure-suits by and against unincorporated associations-which for years
stood as the leading article in the field.
The nineteen-thirties were not only a productive period for the school, but
the life of the school was marked by an intimacy and camaraderie within the
faculty that we who were a part of it look back on with nostalgia. By this
time others had joined us: Ashbel Gulliver, Harry Shulman, Underhill Moore,
Thurman Arnold, and William Douglas. Wesley iwas particularly intimate
with Arnold and Douglas and this trio were very much at the heart of the
school's life in all its aspects.
Later on, after the War, Wesley became our Dean and carried on the fine
tradition of that office. This was a challenging and difficult period of readjust-
ment; under Wesley's leadership it was also a period of growth.
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During this time I came to realize in a new way the truth of George
Dession's appraisal. A faculty soon learns the measure of their Dean's trust-
worthiness, and Wesley's was complete. I also came to see the depth of his
kindliness and his tolerance for the frailties of others-colleagues and students.
There was nothing sentimental about it-it was the tolerance born of strength
and understanding.
And so over a long and close association I have seen many sides of Wesley
and I have seen him in many roles. In all this time I have never felt a sense
of disillusion or disappointment. The bright picture we had of him as students
was never tarnished throughout his life. He has immeasurably enriched the
lives of the individuals and the institutions who have been associated with him.
tLafayette S. Foster Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
WESLEY A. STURGES
Hugo L. Black, Jr.
SOME of us may wonder whether or not we shall live on after we pass. But
we should not so wonder about Dean Sturges.
Dean Sturges excelled at a high calling which offers to those gifted enough
to meet its challenges an extraordinary opportunity to live on after death:
the teaching of the young. He aimed to train leaders of men. He often re-
marked that lawyers are the policy-makers of the world and that a function
of a school of law was to equip its students for policy-making. His techniques
developed that self-reliance so necessary to a man in the lonely hours of de-
ciding a high-level question of policy. That he succeeded in his aim is well
attested: his students sit on the Supreme Court of the United States; in
Governors' mansions; in the Congress of the United States; in the ranking
chairs at the Justice Department, the Treasury Department, the State Depart-
ment, the Department of Defense; as high counsel to corporations and to labor
unions; as partners in the great law firms of America; and in the crowded
loneliness of court rooms all over America.
To the man, all of them will tell you that Wesley Sturges in the class room
contributed more to their development than any other man. For Dean Sturges
could make a class room come alive as no other man could. His techniques
passed science and ascended to the level of art. He never revealed himself to
you, for that would have defeated his ends. He assumed the role of the in-
scrutable and unpredictable world of law and politics which would surround
you when you left the academic halls. It was up to you to take care of yourself
as he asserted and contradicted, growled and smiled, deceived and leveled,
ridiculed and complimented, twisted and darted, attacked and retreated. Dean
Sturges taught from a chair of law. But he taught more than law. He taught les-
sons of character. As the symbol of authority in the class room, he often took a
ridiculous position and pretended to assume that anyone who disagreed with
him had no sense. But if he got by with this posture without challenge from
(Vol. 72: 639
WESLEY A. STURGES: IN MEMORIAM
his students, you could read the disappointment in his face. He meant to teach
intellectual self-relianci and intellectual courage, and if his students failed to
recognize authoritarian nonsense or recognized ib and failed to challenge it
out of fear, he felt he had failed in his purpose.
He taught also the processes of law and the tools of lawyers. He made sure
you had an opponent no matter what statement you made. Either he set another
student against you, or, if he could not find one, then he took you on himself.
Classroom arguments continued into the hall and often into the dormitories.
In the process of teaching the semantics of the law, he was not beyond ask-
ing you to compare the incomparable and to distinguish the indistinguishable,
and, if you indicated it could not be done he would do it. If, as a result of
all this, you were confused and told him that you did not think you were
learning any law in his course, he would just smile and tell you not to worry;
that you could bring all the law you wanted with you to the final exam.
Making you stand on your own was one offshoot of Dean Sturges' guiding
philosophical principle. He believed in individual liberty and individual re-
sponsibility. He would fight in a minute about an invasion of a minority right,
but at the same time he was quick to recognize and cut down a supposed un-
derdog making a false cry of alarm. He believed that every individual should
enjoy the liberties in the Bill of Rights with no ifs, ands, or buts. Although he
would protect the right of a foolish individual to engage in irresponsible con-
duct so long as it hurt no other person, the Dean had no use for personal
irresponsibility once it trenched on the rights of others, nor any desire to help
when he felt that a person had no one but himself to blame for trouble.
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